Productivity growth is slowing around the world. In 2015, the growth of total factor productivity (TFP) hovered around zero for the fourth straight year, down from 1 percent in 1996-2006 and 0.5 percent in 2007-12. In this paper we identify previous episodes of sharp and sustained decelerations in TFP growth using data for a large sample of countries and years. TFP slumps are ubiquitous: We find as many as 77 such episodes, depending on definition, in low-, middle-and high-income countries. Low levels of educational attainment and unusually high investment rates are among the significant country-specific correlates of TFP slumps, and energy-price shocks are among the significant global factors.
Introduction
Productivity growth is slowing around the world. In 2015, according to the Conference Board's Total Economy Data Base, the growth of total factor productivity (TFP) fell by 0.3 percent, after having hovered around zero for the three preceding years (Conference Board 2015) . This was down from 1 percent in 1996-2006 and 0.5 percent in 2007-12. This decline in TFP growth is one of the most disturbing and, no doubt, important phenomena affecting the world economy. In seeking to understand it, it is tempting to invoke the global financial crisis, which disrupted the availability of credit (which itself is important for innovation) and which slowed the growth of international trade (with which increases in productivity and technical efficiency are associated historically). But the slump in TFP growth is widespread; it is not limited to or even differentially evident in countries most directly affected by the financial crisis. In the advanced countries, where the deceleration in productivity growth predates the financial crisis, some observers have invoked the hypothesis of secular stagnation, suggesting that productivity growth has slowed because of a decline in innovation (Gordon 2014) or, possibly, inadequate spending on the demand side (Summers 2014).
But the decline in TFP growth is not limited to the advanced countries most plausibly subject to this secular-stagnation problem. TFP growth has been falling in China (from 2.2 percent per annum in 1999-2006 and 1.3 percent per annum in 2007-13 to 0.1 percent in 2014 and −1.3 percent in 2015). It is negative in Brazil and Mexico. For these countries, it is tempting to invoke the so-called middle-income trap, where growth, including TFP growth, is thought to slow as former low-income countries achieve middle-income status and are no longer able to boost productivity simply by shifting labor from agriculture to manufacturing.
Again, however, the deceleration in TFP growth is not limited to emerging markets that have attained middle-income status. It has declined and is near zero in a number of markets that are still far from middle-income status. It fell in sub-Saharan Africa from 1999-2006 to 2007-12 and again in 2013-14 . It fell in Russia, Central Asia, Southeastern Europe, and Latin America as a whole. 1 Interpreting this phenomenon is not easy. Although it may be possible to gain purchase on the explanatory power of competing hypotheses by comparing the extent of the TFP growth slowdown in different countries in recent years, this approach has limitations. It is not possible to distinguish the importance of global and country-specific factors, for example, because all countries experienced the same changes in the state of the global economy in, say, 2014. Limiting one's attention to the recent spate of TFP slumps does not enable us to gauge to what extent current trends have been witnessed before. This approach does not permit more than crude conjectures about whether the current productivity slump will persist.
In this paper we seek to take advantage of the fact that there have been productivity slumps before. We build a comprehensive database of a large number of countries, focusing on episodes in which the rate of TFP growth has declined. We look at the distribution of per capita incomes at which these slumps have occurred. We consider the distribution of TFP slumps over time. We then examine the global and country-specific correlates of these TFP slumps. Finally we inquire into the question of persistence; specifically, we ask whether it is possible to find cases where TFP growth rates, having declined, accelerate subsequently.
The study closest to ours is Ferriera et al. (2010) . Using a different methodology, the authors identify breaks in TFP growth rates in a sample of 77 countries from 1950 to 2000. They find that breaks were mainly concentrated in the early 1970s in the advanced countries but that they have been much more diverse in their timing in developing countries. They interpret this as suggesting that slumps in TFP growth in the advanced countries are mainly associated with external (global) factors-in particular, with energy price shocks-whereas in developing countries TFP growth slowdowns are mainly attributable to country-specific sources.
The current paper is also related to our own earlier work on growth slowdowns (Eichengreen, Park, and Shin 2012) . But where in that earlier work we were concerned with slowdowns in the rate of growth of GDP-which can be rooted in slower growth of the capital stock, slower growth of the labor force, slower technical progress, and other factors-here we focus exclusively on the rate of growth of TFP. 2 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the extensive if not entirely conclusive literature on productivity slowdowns, much of which was motivated by the productivity problems in the United States and to a lesser extent other advanced countries in the 1970s. Sections 3 describes the basic patterns in the data, Section 4 then considers the circumstances in which TFP slumps occur. In Section 5 we discuss our regression analysis. Section 6, in concluding, attempts to draw out the implications of our results.
Previous literature
A large literature considers possible sources of the sharp slowdown in productivity growth affecting the U.S. economy in the 1970s. In an influential study summarizing the author's own extensive earlier research, Denison (1985) pointed to end of the reallocation of labor from low productivity agriculture and self-employment to higher productivity jobs (in manufacturing in particular), and to the negative impact of the early 1970s-recession on productivity growth. The association between TFP growth and employment in manufacturing is a well-known regularity, tracing back at least to Kuznets (1966) . The association of TFP growth slowdowns with recessions is more controversial. First, there is the possibility that the decline in the level or rate of growth of TFP reflects mismeasurement-that it is really a decline in the effective capital stock due to lower utilization not captured by standard growth-accounting methods (Basu, Fernald, and Kimball 2006) . In addition, there is the fact that not all recessions are associated with slower productivity growth. The Great Depression of the 1930s famously saw an acceleration of TFP growth in the United States (Field 2012) , consistent with the recessions-as-reorganizations view (Hall 1991; Caballero and Hammour 1994) .
Subsequent authors emphasized the association between slower TFP growth and macroeconomic volatility generally, focusing on variables like the level and variability of inflation. Looking across countries, Lindbeck (1983) documented an association between macroeconomic volatility and lower TFP growth in the 1970. But although that slowdown and the rise in macroeconomic volatility appear to coincide, the hypothesis that the association is causal can be questioned, because other factors affecting the economy negatively could have plausibly brought about slower TFP growth and higher inflation simultaneously. Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987) emphasized declining (or more slowly rising) labor quality as a factor in the 1973-79 TFP growth slowdown. This period saw women and young workers with less human capital enter the U.S. labor force, where they went disproportionately into low-paying, relatively low productivity jobs. There may have also been some decline in the quality of education in the United States beginning in the 1960s. According to some authors, the observed decline in Standardized Achievement Test (SAT) scores is indicative of this tendency. But the accuracy of those SAT-based measures has been questioned. And there is no agreement on whether this is properly viewed as an actual decline in TFP growth or growing mismeasurement of labor input (when the latter is not adjusted for quality).
In a classic contribution, Jorgenson (1984) showed that energy prices can affect TFP growth if technical progress is energy-using (i.e., biased toward the use of energy). He confirmed the existence of this bias for the United States but found that the magnitude of the effect was small. A related literature explores the possibility that energy price volatility results in the obsolescence of a portion of the existing capital and perhaps, along with it, a portion of the stock of previously accumulated knowledge. Moomaw and Williams (1991) , however, looked across U.S. states, which vary in their energy intensity, and found no impact on differential TFP growth slowdowns in the 1970s and after. Hulton, Robertson, and Wykoff (1987) looked directly at the price of used capital equipment and found little evidence of an obsolescence effect.
Information technology (IT) is a prominent suspect in the recent productivity slowdown. Attributing a role to IT takes some ingenuity, however, because IT is both popularly credited for the acceleration in productivity growth in 1995-2005 (most markedly in the United States) as well as being blamed for the subsequent slowdown. It could be that the development and diffusion of new IT come in waves or clusters, where a first wave was developed but not yet successfully deployed prior to 1995, whereas a second wave is being developed but has not yet been commercially applied since 2005. Consistent with this view, Fernald (2014) finds that the post-2004 slowdown in TFP growth in the United States is heavily concentrated in sectors that use IT intensively or produce it.
In contrast, Carderelli and Lusinyan (2015) , looking across U.S. states, find no difference between IT-intensive and other states in the extent of the TFP slowdown after 2005. Their analysis suggests, rather, that states with high educational attainment have tended to have higher and faster-growing TFP in recent years. In their earlier study, Moomaw and Williams (1991) similarly found that differential state investments in education significantly shaped states' success in maintaining TFP growth.
The literature on other countries is equally extensive. A prominent case in point is Japan, where average TFP growth fell from 1.84 percent in the 1980s to 0.42 percent in the 1990s and 0.16 percent in the first decade of the 21st century. Muto, Sudo and Toneyama (2013) emphasize the role of financial disruptions in preventing firms with high-productivity projects from accessing external finance. One might also point to the role of banks in keeping low-productivity zombie firms alive. An awkward observation for this last hypothesis, however, is that many of these zombie firms were in sectors like real estate, construction, retail, and wholesale, whereas the slowdown in TFP growth was most pronounced in manufacturing. Fukao and Kwon (2005) therefore examine the role of research and development (R&D) spending on productivity growth. There is some decline in R&D intensity in Japan, as elsewhere, starting in the early 1990s, reflecting among other things weak demand growth, financial distress, and credit-market disruptions. Comin (2009) similarly notes that R&D expenditures stopped growing in Japan in the 1990s, while the speed of diffusion of new technologies slowed down. More generally, the slowdown in TFP growth in Japan appears to have been most pronounced in firms and sectors with relatively low R&D intensity. Kuroda, Motohashi, and Shimpo (2007) blame Japanese underinvestment in IT for the failure of TFP growth to pick up after 1995 as quickly as in the United States. They find that TFP growth was maintained in the 1990s in Japan only in IT-using electrical machinery and communication services, reflecting the IT revolution.
As for the persistence of the TFP slump into the subsequent period when Japanese investment in IT picked up, Nishimura and Shirai (2003) find some tendency for IT to have a negative indirect effect on productivity. In the past, they argue, the technological and managerial strengths of Japanese firms were based on learning by doing in the workplace. But as knowledge management systems improve as a result of IT and knowledge is easily transferred across international borders, Japan may no longer have the same advantage as before.
There is also some evidence for Japan and Europe that the slump in TFP growth is greatest for sectors and countries whose international transactions have been growing most slowly. For Europe the evidence suggests that countries where the share of tradeables has fallen by less have done better in terms of maintaining earlier rates of TFP growth.
The literature on TFP growth in emerging markets is spottier, reflecting data limitations. Young (1994) and Krugman (1994) famously argued that the problem of low TFP growth in East Asian emerging markets was of long standing, a conclusion challenged on grounds of mismeasurement by Hsieh (2002) . More generally, there is no consensus on how TFP growth will develop in emerging markets, creating a temptation, as Tsounta (2014) notes, to extrapolate the experience of the recent past. In projecting future growth rates, Tsounta himself assumes that the rate of TFP growth experienced in the 2000-12 period will continue to prevail in coming years.
Other investigators have taken the available estimates at face value and considered trends and fluctuations of TFP growth rates over time. Kim (2001) compares changes in TFP growth between 1960-73 and 1973-94 across regions (advanced Europe and North America, emerging Latin America, South Asia, and East Asia alike). According to his tabulations, every region other than South Asia and East Asia showed a marked decline between these periods (where TFP growth in South Asia had been very low, barely positive, in 1960-73, and where TFP growth in East Asia declined only slightly).
What general conclusions are to be drawn from these patterns? We now turn to this question, starting with some empirical regularities, in the next section.
Basic patterns
We take data on TFP growth from the Penn World Tables (PWT) 8.1, the installment that covers the period ending in 2011. This is the second PWT release including estimates of TFP.
We seek to isolate episodes where TFP growth slows significantly and persistently as well as episodes where it first slows significantly and persistently but then recovers. Intuitively, the first set of TFP slumps is "permanent," and the second is "transitory." We consider all countries with a per capita GDP in purchasing power parity terms of at least US$ 4,000 in constant 2005 U.S. dollars. Countries with very low incomes tend to have unusually volatile output and TFP growth rates, reflecting idiosyncratic country-specific factors such as climatic variations and civil unrest. 4 We therefore exclude them from our analysis.
We identify TFP slumps and recoveries using a methodology in the spirit of our earlier work on growth slowdowns. We consider successive 5-, 7-, and 10-year periods (alternatively) and isolate episodes where the growth rate of TFP was at least 1.0 percent or 1.5 percent lower (alternatively) on average in the second period than the first. In addition, to qualify as a TFP slump, TFP in the first of the two periods must have been growing at a respectable rate (where "respectable" is taken as the mean growth rate in the sample of countries and years).
Similarly, for accelerations we focus on observations where the growth rate of TFP averaged (at least) 1.0 or 1.5 percent more in the second period than the first. Again, for an episode to qualify as a recovery, TFP in the second period had to be growing by at least the sample average.
In some cases this methodology identifies a string of consecutive years as TFP slumps (or accelerations). 5 One way of dealing with this is to count each entry in this series as a slowdown year. The alternative is to use a Chow test for structural breaks to select one year of the series as the TFP slump year. In what follows we consider both approaches.
For straightforward reasons, the shorter the period and lower the cutoff, the more slump and recovery episodes we identify. We identify 77 countries that have experienced a TFP slump when using the 5-year / 1 percent criterion. By comparison, 52 countries qualify as having experienced TFP slumps when we use the most restrictive criterion of 10 years and a 1.5 percent threshold. Seventy-five countries experience a TFP acceleration in the countries, there is the possibility of relatively large mismeasurement for lower income countries, which tend to be subject to relatively large revisions in subsequent versions of the PWT, reflecting relatively large revisions in their underlying national accounts. In terms of comparisons over time, there is the possibility that measures of TFP growth are biased down because quality improvement is captured inadequately by published GDP. Nevertheless, those who have studied it generally conclude that there is no evidence that this bias has been growing more severe over time, as would be needed in order for it to explain the recent TFP slowdown, or that it has any particular temporal characteristic (Byrne, Fernald, and Reinsdorf 2016) . Readers may worry that we are simply capturing the same slowdowns in GDP growth as in Eichengreen, Park, and Shin (2012) , since TFP (as opposed to capital and labor input) is the component of gross output whose rate of increase often falls most abruptly when the rate of growth of aggregate output slows. In fact, although growth slowdowns and TFP slumps do sometimes coincide, there are also many instances where they do not. Recall, for example, the Asian crisis in the late 1990s, following which the rate of GDP growth slowed noticeably across the region. In some countries, that slowing was associated with an abrupt downshift in the rate of growth of TFP, as we show. But in other instances it was associated instead with a downshift in the investment rate, as emphasized by Rajan (2006) , among others.
Consider, for example, our least-demanding definition of TFP slowdowns: slowdowns of at least 5 year's duration in which TFP growth falls by 1 percentage point. There are 681 country-year observations that qualify by these criteria. 6 Ask now how many of these years are also categorized as a growth slowdown, and, to bias the results in the direction of overlap, include also growth slowdowns in the preceding or successive year. The answer is 440, about 65 percent of our TFP-slowdown country-year observations.
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Figures 1, 2, and 3, show histograms for, respectively, TFP slumps, accelerations, and recoveries (where, recall, a recovery is a slump followed by an acceleration) for the least 6 The number of observations is based on the approach where we include all consecutive years as TFP slumps.
7 The ratio is even lower (58.8 percent) for 7-year periods and again when we use 10-year periods (63.4 percent). restrictive definition, a 1 percent deceleration over successive 5-year periods. For slumps (Figure 1) , we see three modes around US$ 4,000, US$ 11,000, and US$ 33,000. 8 It is tempting to interpret these in terms of the productivity problems of poor countries (where 8 Although the third mode around $33,000 is less visible for the most restrictive definition, the three modes are clearly visible in the other five definitions including the one shown in Figure 1 . An productivity is affected by climatic variations, political turmoil, etc.), of middle-income countries (where the challenges of transition from "extensive" to "intensive" growth are sometimes thought to create the danger of a middle-income trap), and of high-income countries (which have relatively high old-age dependency ratios and slowly growing populations and face the additional challenges of raising productivity when they are already at or near the technological frontier). Figure 2 , the histogram for accelerations, looks broadly similar in that we have a first mode around the same level of per capita GDP as in Figure 1 . The second mode appears to occur a little earlier, at around US$ 10,000. 9 The third mode occurs much earlier, at around US$ 16,000-18,000. Evidently, accelerations are extremely unlikely once the per capita GDP exceeds US$ 30,000. 
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For the advanced countries, in particular, it is tempting to associate productivity slowdowns with the oil shocks of the 1970s and early 1980s (as in much of the earlier literature). Column (1) in Table 2 confirms that a large majority of the advanced countries experienced productivity slowdowns in these two oil-shock periods. Column (2), however, also shows that slowdowns in this period account for only a minority of all productivity growth unpublished appendix that includes the figures for the other five definitions is available upon request from the authors. slumps experienced by the advanced countries between the 1950s and 2011. Evidently, the story for the advanced countries involves more than just oil shocks.
To gain a sense of which of these time spans and thresholds are most informative for empirical work, it helps to consider some well-known cases. As described earlier, Denison United States in 1995 only when we use 5-year averages with a 1 percent cutoff. The 5-year average TFP growth rate before and after 1995 is 0.8 percent and 2.0 percent, respectively. When we use 7-year averages, the TFP growth rate before and after1995 is 0.8 and 1.5 percent, respectively, rendering the difference less than the 1 percent cutoff. When we use 10-year averages, the TFP growth rates are again 0.8 percent and 1.5 percent. Interestingly, the 5-year / 1 percent cutoff places the earlier productivity slowdown for the United States as occurring in 1965-66, following the earlier post-World War II golden age of rapid productivity growth. 12 Longer periods tend to place this earlier productivity slump as occurring somewhat later and perhaps in two steps; for example, the 10-year / 1 percent criterion identifies as TFP slump years 1966-68 and 1972-73. 13 For China, where TFP growth is more volatile, the 5-year / 1 percent criterion picks up an acceleration in 1976-83 (coincident with the first wave of reforms), a slump in the second half of the 1980s, a recovery in the first half of the 1990s, another slump in the second half of that decade, and another recovery in the period 2001-14. The more restrictive 10-year / 1.5 percent criterion points only to an acceleration in 1978-85 followed by a slump in 1993-96. For Greece, another currently prominent case, the 10-year / 1.5 percent criterion points to a long sequence of TFP slump years between 1965 and 1980 and then to a second slump in 2001. For Germany it produces a first TFP growth slowdown in 1960 (at the end of the Wirtschaftswunder) and a second slump in 1972-79 (at the time of the 1970s productivity slowdown).
Although generalization is difficult, we are inclined to argue that less restrictive definitions (shorter periods distinguished by smaller changes in the average rate of TFP growth) are picking up more signal than noise (i.e., they are likely to capture more of the episodes of interest).
Circumstances in which TFP slumps occur
We now consider the circumstances in which TFP slumps occur. We relate the incidence of slumps first to country characteristics and then to global conditions. As for the former, we consider per capita GDP in U.S. dollars (in levels and squared to pick up nonlinearities), the investment rate, economic openness (as measured by the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP), a measure of real exchange rate undervaluation (the deviation of the real exchange rate from the value predicted by regressing the real rate on per capita GDP, demographic controls, and a vector of time dummies), years of schooling as a measure of educational attainment, the investment rate, the share of employment in manufacturing, two measures of the dependency ratio (old-age dependency and both old-age-and-youth dependency), two measures of political stability and development (how the country ranks in terms of rule of law and its Polity2 ranking), two measures of macroeconomic volatility (average inflation and the volatility of inflation as captured by its coefficient of variation over the preceding five years), and two measures of energy prices (real gas and electricity costs). On the rationale for focusing on these variables, see the discussion in Section 2. Table 3 shows average values for these variables in years when TFP growth begins to decelerate significantly, compared with other years. Sources and definitions are listed in Appendix A.
To avoid spurious precision, we include the years immediately preceding (t − 1) and following (t + 1) the slump year in the treatment group (along with the year t in question).
We also drop all data for years t + 2, . . . t + 5 of the growth slowdown episode to contrast more clearly slump years and other years.
Starting with panel (A) (all countries with per capita incomes above US$ 4,000 and all consecutive TFP slowdown points), we see that per capita GDP is lower in slowdown cases than in the control group. This pattern is reversed, however, in the sample of relatively advanced countries (panels C and D). We also see that the educational attainment (as proxied by years of schooling) is significantly lower in slowdown cases than the control group, consistent with the idea that education is positive for productivity growth. In addition, investment is significantly higher in slowdown years, consistent with the notion of a tradeoff between the extensive and intensive margins of growth. Slowdown cases have also weaker political systems as measured by their Polity2 scores. These differences will come through clearly in the regression analysis.
TFP slowdowns tend to be marked by lower energy costs than control group cases; this is inconsistent with the argument, deriving from the experience of the 1970s, that productivity slowdowns are associated with energy shocks, but consistent with the view that subsidized energy prices distort resource allocation and hinder productivity growth. Note, however, that our International Energy Agency data for energy costs, which vary by country, start only in 1979 and therefore exclude the first oil shock. They may reflect crosscountry differences in taxes and subsidies as much (or more) than changing global energy prices. We will return to this later.
Although old-age dependency ratios are significantly lower in TFP slump cases, overall dependency ratios tend to be higher. In addition, the openness of countries experiencing TFP slumps on average increases more rapidly than that of members of the control group. This feature disappears in the sample of relatively advanced countries (panels C and D), however. 14 14 There is the possibility that this somewhat counterintuitive relationship between the change in openness and TFP slowdowns reflects business-cycle factors: that the openness ratio rises, in an Productivity slumps are also more likely in countries where the share of employment (or value-added) in manufacturing is high and growing slowly. They appear to be accompanied by higher rates of inflation but lower levels of inflation variability (less macroeconomic volatility, so measured), where recall that inflation variability here is the coefficient of variation of the inflation rate. We will want to examine the robustness of this contrast in what follows.
Panel (B) shows that these differences are broadly similar when we limit the treatment group to the TFP slump years identified by the Chow-test criterion. The patterns are also broadly similar when we limit the sample to countries with per capital GDP above US$ 10,000 in 2005 prices-as in panel (C). The differences basically remain the same, with slump episodes displaying lower levels of educational attainment, higher investment rates, higher manufacturing employment shares, higher manufacturing value-added, lower Polity2 scores, and lower energy prices. One important difference is that productivity slumps are more likely in countries where the rule-of law is low. In addition, productivity slumps are more likely in countries where the real exchange rate is more undervalued.
Regression analysis
In our regression analysis, the dependent variable takes a value of 1 for the three years centered on the year when a TFP slump begins. We drop all data pertaining to years t + 2, . . . t + 5 of the TFP slump episode as a way of removing the remainder of the slump period to which either 0 or 1 may not be appropriately assigned. We include among the treatment-group cases all (consecutive) TFP slump years, and define slumps by considering successive 5-year periods and isolating episodes where the growth rate of TFP was at least 1.0 percent lower on average in the second period than the first.
The control group then consists of countries that did not experience a TFP slowdown in that same year. We also removed the observations for 2007-11 entirely because that period is too short (four years rather than five) to determine whether they are in the treatment or control group.
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The sample again includes only countries with per capita GDP is above US$ 4,000 in constant 2005 U.S. dollars, and oil exporting countries are also excluded. In alternative regressions focusing on advanced countries, we also consider only countries with per capita incomes above US$ 10,000. Probit regressions do not allow for country fixed effects, arithmetic sense, when its denominator (GDP) falls, and that fall in GDP accompanies the TFP slump. The fact that the dependent variable is measured over a relatively long interval, not at a business cycle frequency, renders us skeptical that this is the case, however. Asian Economic Papers
The Global Productivity Slump: Common and Country-Specific Factors so we report logit regressions that do. 16 Results using probit are reported in the text where they make a significant difference-see Tables 6 and 7 later in this paper-and a complete set of probit regression are in Appendix B.
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Because regression results tend to be overly influenced by outliers, we removed outliers in openness and inflation-variables where the outlier problem was particularly severe. In the case of openness, we removed observations where the sum of imports and exports was more than 200 percent of GDP. For inflation, we removed observations where the annual inflation rate exceeded 50 percent, and for inflation variability we removed cases where the coefficient of variation over the past five years exceeded 2. We return to the importance of extreme values of these variables at the end of this section. Readers may also worry that our results are sensitive to defining as TFP slumps only episodes where TFP was proceeding at the sample average or faster in the preceding period-that we exclude a number of mainly troubled low-income countries experiencing below-average TFP growth all through the preceding period and the episode itself. In fact, the results we report herein are robust to adding in these additional observations.
Consider the variables that are significant in one or more columns of Table 4 . 18 The probability of a TFP slowdown appears to peak (in panel A) at a per capita income of US$ 11,000-15,000. 19 This resembles an appropriately weighted average of the three modes at US$ 4,000, US$ 11,000, and US$ 33,000 evident in the raw data.
In addition, years of schooling are negatively (and in some cases significantly) associated with the incidence of TFP slumps. This is consistent with the notion that countries that invest heavily in education are best able to continue moving up the technological ladder and stay close to the technical frontier.
High investment rates are positively associated with the likelihood of TFP slumps. This is consistent with the idea that countries relying on brute-force capital accumulation may do so at the expense of productivity, insofar as extensive investment means investment in low-productivity, low-return projects. This observation is also consistent with worries that countries like China, which rely on investment for growth, may be substituting capacity expansion for increases in efficiency.
There is also some evidence that the rate of increase in the share of employment in manufacturing in the preceding five years is associated with the likelihood of a TFP slump. Shifting labor from agriculture to manufacturing has been an important way of sustaining productivity growth historically. The higher the speed of the change in the past, the more difficult it becomes to raise it still further in both an economic and arithmetic sense. The patterns in Table 4 are broadly consistent with this view.
It would appear that countries with stronger, more contestable political systems (higher Polity2 scores) are less susceptible to TFP slumps. This is consistent with the idea that efficient political systems that give voice to stakeholders are better able to agree on reforms and policies that sustain productivity growth. The quality of political institutions comes through more clearly in Table 4 , which includes developing countries, than in Table 5 , which is limited to relatively advanced countries.
We also see in Table 4 some sign that more open economies are more susceptible to TFP slumps. This pattern comes through more clearly when we control for global factors (see Table 8 later in this paper). The intuition for this pattern is not obvious; we return to it subsequently. Also surprising is that a number of plausible explanations for TFP slumps, such as macroeconomic variability, do not register significantly in these regressions.
In Table 5 , where we focus on countries with per capita GDP above US$ 10,000 ("advanced economies" for present purposes), the results are generally consistent with those in Table 4 . Here, however, the rate of increase in years of schooling in the preceding five years appears to be associated with less likelihood of a TFP slump. In addition, countries with high share of employment in manufacturing are more susceptible to TFP slumps. We will return to this in Table 8 where we consider global factors as well as country-specific factors.
In Tables 6 and 7 we return to the impact of openness and macroeconomic volatility. We first remove very high values of openness, cases where the sum of export plus imports exceeds 80 percent of GDP. 20 Now, the coefficient on openness in Table 6 is negative and occasionally significant, not positive and significant as before. 21 It would appear that more open economies, where international competition is more intense, are less prone to TFP slumps up to a threshold level, but above that level any additional benefit of openness, in terms of TFP growth resiliency, disappears. In Table 7 we also remove high values of inflation variability, where the coefficient of variation of inflation is greater than 0.5. 22 Now the effect of inflation variability is positive and often highly significant, as if macroeconomic volatility makes TFP slowdowns more likely. 23 It would appear that volatility makes TFP slowdowns more likely as it rises up to a threshold level, but above that level its impact, like that of openness, vanishes.
The year fixed effects, when included, are jointly significant. They are telling us that global (as opposed to the country-specific factors included in the specifications) are important in helping to explain the incidence of productivity slumps. In Figures 5 and 6 and Table 8 we therefore consider the role of global factors more closely, focusing on world oil prices, world trade growth, LIBOR, and the TED spread. The increase in global oil prices and world trade are shown in Figure 5 , and LIBOR and the TED spread are shown in Figure 6 .
The problem with analyzing factors that vary over years but not across countries is that we are forced to remove the time fixed effects, creating the danger that our global factors may also be picking up time-varying, country-invariant omitted factors. Be that as it may, Table 8 shows that a higher TED spread is positively associated with the incidence of TFP slumps. This result is striking in that the prominent instance of higher TED spreads, in the global financial crisis, is not considered here because the last slump year considered in our analysis is 2006, given the five-year window.
In addition, the coefficient on the rate of change of world oil prices is positively and significantly associated with the incidence of TFP slumps, consistent with the oil-shock interpretation of the 1970s and early 1980s productivity slowdowns. Note, however, that this result is not robust to including the full set of controls.
More puzzling is that world trade growth is positively and significantly associated with TFP slumps; it could be that world trade is standing in for the global business cycle and that TFP growth tends to weaken around the business cycle peak.
The other country-specific effects are unchanged with one exception. A high manufacturing employment share now appears to make a TFP slump less likely, at least for countries with per capita GDPs above US$ 10,000. This is consistent with the notion that, for advanced countries, a TFP slowdown is less likely as long as the share of the high-growing manufacturing sector is large. It is natural to hypothesize that global factors will appear even more important once we have the data needed to treat 2007-12 as a slump period (recall that our PWT data, on which we rely for estimates of TFP, currently end in 2011). For the moment, what we can do is examine successive four-year rather than five-year periods. 24 When we do, it turns out that fully 5.7 percent of total TFP slowdowns occur in 2007, which becomes the mode of the distribution of TFP slumps by calendar year. Once the large number of slowdowns 24 The worry being, of course, that the shorter the period the greater the likelihood that what we are picking up is the cyclical behavior of productivity rather than secular TFP slumps. Countries with per capita GDP above $10,000 
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Asian Economic Papers in 2007 is added, the coefficient on LIBOR becomes positive and significant. The coefficient on the TED spread remains positive and is now more consistently significant than before. There is more evidence that oil shocks are significant. Reassuringly, world trade growth, with its peculiar sign, is no longer significant in the specifications in Table 8 .
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TFP as presented in the PWT is not adjusted for changes in hours of work, only number of workers, presumably because information on hours is not available for a substantial subset of countries. When we make the hours adjustment ourselves, doing so substantially reduces the number of countries in the sample.
The important point is that when we do so, most of the significant effects carry over. 26 One change is that high investment rates are no longer predictive of growth slowdowns when we restrict the sample to countries with per capita incomes over US$ 10,000. This makes intuitive sense; it is typically emerging markets as opposed to advanced countries that raise TFP for a period by investing heavily in manufacturing capacity and transferring workers from agriculture to industry, but which then see productivity slump if they fail to rebalance toward consumption and services (some will think of this as "the China syndrome").
Another change is that the effects of the political system are not robust to this smaller sample. A final change is that, of the global factors we consider, only energy-price shocks are robust.
Conclusion
Slowing TFP growth is raising concern around the world. After running at approximatelyDiscussion of this troubling trend is organized under a number of headings. These include the secular stagnation hypothesis, the question of whether the global financial crisis has permanently damaged the growth capacity of the world economy, and whether the heyday of emerging markets is over. These are among the critical debates of our day.
The key questions are whether this phenomenon of sharply lower productivity growth is unprecedented, whether it is likely to last, which countries are most susceptible, and what can be done about it. To shed light on the answers, we have isolated TFP slumps in countries with per capita GDPs of at least US$ 4,000 (2005 prices) since the 1950s. It turns out that productivity slumps, defined as episodes when the rate of TFP growth fell sharply and persistently, are ubiquitous. We have identified such episodes in the first half of the 1970s (the period commented upon most extensively in the literature on this subject) but also in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in the late 1990s, and on the eve of the global financial crisis.
We have identified TFP slumps in low-, middle-and high-income countries alike. Specifically, we observe clusters at per capita incomes of US$ 4,000, US$ 11,000, and US$ 33,000. Evidently, no country, rich or poor, and no period is immune from the risk of productivity slumps.
Our analysis points to policies that should be pursued and others best avoided by countries seeking to minimize this risk. We find a negative association between TFP slumps and educational attainment. Countries with stronger political systems as measured by their Polity2 scores are less susceptible to TFP slumps. In contrast, countries-especially developing countries-with very high investment rates are more susceptible to TFP slumps, consistent with the existence of a trade-off between extensive and intensive growth that places a priority on, respectively, capacity expansion and rising productivity.
The distinction between global and country-specific correlates of TFP slumps is important. Recall how the oil shocks of the 1970s and 1980s and the global financial crisis (as well as other periods marked by sharply higher TED spreads) adversely affected the productivity of a large number of countries, although some were hit harder than others. By the same token, the information and communication technology revolution of the 1990s contributed to higher productivity across much of the world.
While TFP slumps affect rich and poor countries alike, the nature of productivity slumps is likely to differ across countries at different income levels. In middle-income countries, slower TFP growth is likely to be associated with the process of reallocation of labor from agriculture to manufacturing having run its course. Productivity slumps in high-income countries, in contrast, are likely to be associated with the transition to services, where productivity gains are more difficult to achieve.
Slowing TFP growth is specifically worrisome for China and developing Asia. Sustained rapid growth has transformed Asia from a predominantly low-income to an increasingly middle-income region. Although the transition from low to middle income was driven to a large part by investment and factor accumulation, the more challenging transition from middle income to high income typically depends on improving productivity.
Hence, if the region is to continue growing, productivity growth will have to play a larger role. Many Asian countries' gloomy demographic prospects reinforce the point. While Asia reaped a sizable demographic dividend in the past, the region as a whole is now experiencing population aging. Higher old-age dependency ratios imply lower saving and investment rates, insofar as the predictions of the life-cycle model of saving apply. Higher old-age dependency ratios also make for the allocation of more investment toward health care and other age-relevant services and less toward investment in, inter alia, manufacturing. Insofar as the elderly consume a higher ratio of services to manufactures than the population as a whole, this points to the difficulty Asian countries in particular have had in boosting productivity in services.
Moreover, the transformation of developing Asia, especially East Asia, from a capitalscarce to a capital-abundant region-the legacy of the high-saving, high-investment paradigm-implies that the marginal returns to physical capital accumulation will decline. TFP growth will thus be vital. Asia's rapid technological catch-up in the past means that further technological progress will have to rely more on indigenous innovation.
The determinants of productivity growth and productivity slumps are notoriously elusive. It follows that the patterns described here are necessarily suggestive. There is no guarantee that countries investing heavily in education, avoiding excessive investment, and limiting their dependence on volatile global energy markets will necessarily avoid TFP slumps. The good news is that there are in the historical record not just TFP growth slowdowns but also TFP growth accelerations and even recoveries (accelerations following slumps). Whether such accelerations and recoveries are now on the horizon, only time will tell. Because TFP slumps and accelerations appear to respond to a number of country characteristics in similar ways, it is not surprising that the determinants of TFP growth recoveries (Tables C3 and C4 ) again look broadly similar. We again see a positive coefficient on investment, opposite-signed coefficients on the two dependency rates, and a positive coefficient on the change in openness.
Appendix
Appendix Table B1 . Determinants of TFP slumps for countries with per capita GDP above US$ 4,000 (probit, consecutive points) Appendix Table B2 . Determinants of TFP slumps for countries whose per capita GDP is above $10,000 (probit, consecutive points) 
Note:
We report logit regression results with year and country fixed effects included. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the three years centered on the year when a TFP acceleration begins. We define accelerations by considering successive five-year periods and isolating episodes where the growth rate of TFP was at least 1.0 percent higher on average in the second period than the first. We use the entire string of consecutive years as TFP accelerations. 
